PO44 | OFFICIAL CONTROLS AND FOOD BUSINESS OPERATOR RATING SYSTEMS IN ITALY: RULES AND PERSPECTIVES

Gregorio Claudio Navarra, Dario Dongo, Claudio Biglia | Università degli Studi di Torino, Italy.

Aim. The study aims to analyse the implementation of risk classification and Food Business Operator (FBO) rating systems within the framework of Regulation (EU) 2017/625, focusing on the Italian official control system. Particular attention is devoted to regional approaches to risk categorisation, the degree of development of operator rating models, and the potential contribution of voluntary private schemes to food safety governance.

Methods. The research was based on a legal and comparative analysis of the European and Italian regulatory framework governing official controls. Primary sources included Regulation (EU) 2017/625, the Italian Multi-Annual National Control Plan, national guidance documents on risk categorisation, State–Regions agreements, and regional administrative acts. Five Italian regions (Tuscany, Lombardy, Emilia-Romagna, Piedmont and Sicily) were selected to ensure geographical representation and to compare different levels of development in risk categorisation and operator rating systems, as well as to ensure the availability of documentation. The analysis examined the structure of the models, the criteria used for risk assessment, the degree of transparency, and their impact on official control planning. In addition, a voluntary private scheme, COSA (Culture of Organisational Food Safety Assessment), was analysed as a case study of a food safety culture rating model based on organisational and behavioural indicators assessed through third-party audits.

Results. The study found that, although the Italian official control system is based on common national and European principles, significant regional differences exist in the practical implementation of risk categorisation. Tuscany has developed one of the most structured models, characterised by formalised scoring systems, standardised evaluation criteria and greater integration between risk assessment and inspection planning. Other regions rely primarily on risk categorisation tools without implementing comprehensive operator rating schemes. Differences were observed in assessment methodologies, transparency of criteria, publication of results and operational use of risk classifications.
The analysis of the COSA voluntary model highlighted both opportunities and limitations. Strengths include the assessment of organisational factors and food safety culture, dimensions that are difficult to capture through traditional official controls. However, the absence of formal recognition within the official control framework, limited comparability with public systems and potential conflicts of interest remain significant challenges.

Conclusions. The findings indicate that Italy has progressively adopted risk-based official controls, but the implementation of operator rating systems remains fragmented across regions. Greater harmonisation of assessment criteria, transparency of methodologies and integration of qualitative indicators would improve consistency and comparability. Voluntary models such as COSA may complement official controls by providing additional information on organisational performance and food safety culture, although their future contribution depends on ensuring transparency, independence and methodological reliability. The development of a more coordinated framework combining public and voluntary approaches could strengthen both food safety protection and consumer confidence.
Keywords: Official controls; Food Business Operators; Risk categorisation; Food safety governance; Rating systems; Regulation (EU) 2017/625; Food safety culture; Italy.